Abstract. In this paper we introduce indeed two alternative formulations of the theory of evidence by proving that both plausibility and commonality functions share the same combinatorial structure of sum function of belief functions, and computing their Moebius inverses called basic plausibility and commonality assignments. The equivalence of the associated formulations of the ToE is mirrored by the geometric congruence of the related simplices. Applications to the probabilistic approximation problem are briefly presented.
Introduction
The theory of evidence (ToE) is one of the most popular uncertainty theory [1, 2] , even though it has been recently subjected to criticism [3] . Subjective probability is there represented by belief function (b.f.) rather than a Bayesian mass distribution, assigning probability values to sets of possibilities rather than single events. Variants or continuous extensions of the ToE in terms of hints [4] or allocations of probability [5] have since been proposed. In this paper we introduce indeed two alternative formulations of the theory of evidence by proving that both pl.f.s and comm.f.s share the same combinatorial structure of sum function, and computing their Moebius inverses which is natural to call basic plausibility and commonality assignments. We achieve this by resorting to a recent geometric approach to the theory of evidence [7] in which belief functions are represented by points of a Cartesian space. Besides giving the overall mathematical structure of the theory of evidence a more elegant symmetry, the notions of b.pl.a.s and b.comm.a.s turn out to be useful when solving problems like finding probabilistic approximations [8, 9, 10] of belief functions, or computing the canonical decomposition of support functions. Moreover, as they are discovered through geometric methods, basic plausibility and commonality assignments inherit the same simplicial geometry as that of b.f.s.
The novel contributions of this paper are then the proofs that:
-commonality functions have a Moebius inverse that we call basic commonality assignment (Theorem 1), the study of its properties and geometries (Theorems 2 and 3); -the equivalence of the alternative formulations of the ToE is geometrically mirrored by the congruence of the corresponding simplices (Theorem 4);
To support the usefulness of these alternative formulations, some applications of basic plausibility assignments to the approximation problem are discussed. We first recall the basic notions of the ToE and its geometric approach.
Belief, Plausibility, and Commonality Functions
Even though belief functions can be given several alternative but equivalent definitions in terms of multi-valued mappings, random sets [11, 12] , inner measures [13] , in Shafer's formulation [1] a central role is played by the notion of "basic probability assignment". A basic probability assignment (b.p.a.) over a finite set (frame of discernment
Subsets of Θ associated with non-zero values of m are called focal elements.
The belief function
A finite probability or Bayesian belief function is a special b.f. assigning non-zero masses only to singletons :
Functions of the form (1) on a partially ordered set are called sum functions [6] . A belief function b is then the sum function associated with a basic probability assignment m b on the partially ordered set (2 Θ , ⊆). Conversely, the unique basic probability assignment m b associated with a given belief function b can be recovered by means of the Moebius inversion formula
A sum function can be seen as the discrete counterpart of the indefinite integral in calculus, and Moebius inversion as the discrete counterpart of the derivative. A dual mathematical representation of the evidence encoded by a belief function b is the plausibility function
where
expresses the amount of evidence not against A. 
Two Alternative Formulations of the ToE
As plausibility and commonality functions are both equivalent representations of the evidence carried by a belief function, it is natural to guess that they should share the form of sum function on the power set 2 Θ . We can indeed use results and tools provided by the geometric interpretation of the ToE to develop alternative models of uncertainty which are parallel to the standard formulation of the ToE. Evidence is there represented by cumulating basic probabilities on intervals of events {B ⊆ A} (yielding a belief value b(A) = B⊆A m(B)). Equivalently we can represent pieces of evidence as basic plausibility (commonality) assignments on the power set, and compute the related plausibility (commonality) set function by adding basic assignments over intervals. Let us first recall the geometry of belief measures.
The set of points B of R N −1 which correspond to a b.f. is called "belief space" [7] , i.e. the simplex
where b A is the unique belief function assigning all the mass to a single subset A of Θ (A-th dogmatic belief function), and Cl denotes the convex closure operator:
.., b k ) are all possible simplices generated by a subset of its vertices. Each b.f. b ∈ B can be written as a convex sum as follows: 
where Change of reference frame. In the case of a general domain Θ, the dogmatic belief functions {b A : ∅ A Θ} form a set of independent vectors in R N −2 , so that the collections {v A } and {b A } represent two distinct coordinate frames in B. We can then compute the transformation linking them [14] . 
Basic Plausibility Assignment
The geometry of belief measures can be exploited to prove the structure of sum function of both plausibility and commonality functions, establishing this way two equivalent formulations of the ToE in terms of basic plausibilities and commonalities. To get there we need to compute the Moebius inverse of pl.f.s and comm.f.s respectively. Plausibility space. Plausibility functions are indeed also completely specified by their N − 2 plausibility values {pl b (A), ∅ A Θ} and can then be represented in the same reference frames as before as
It can be proved that [14] Figure 2 shows the geometry of belief and plausibility spaces for a binary frame Θ 2 = {x, y}, where pl.f.s are also vectors of
are symmetric with respect to the segment of all probability measures P and congruent, so that they can be moved onto each other by means of a rigid transformation.
Plausibility assignment. We can use Lemma 1 to compute the Moebius inverse of a pl.f., by putting (6) in the same form as Equation (4) . We get that
It is natural to call the function μ b : 2 Θ → R defined by expression (7) basic plausibility assignment (b.pl.a.). By comparing (7) with the Moebius formula for b.f.s (2) it is easy to recognize the Moebius equation for plausibilities: hence
PL.F.s are then sum functions on 2 Θ of the form (8), whose Moebius inverse is the b.pl.a. (7). Basic probabilities and plausibilities are obviously related.
Proposition 2. μ b (A) = (−1)
As b.p.a.s do, basic plausibility assignments meet the normalization constraint. In other words, pl.f.s are normalized sum functions [6] . 
Using Equation (7) we can compute its b.pl.a. as
confirming that b.pl.a. meet the normalization but not the positivity constraint.
Basic Commonality Assignment
It is straightforward to prove that commonality functions are also sum functions and possess some interesting similarities with pl.f.s. They present though some peculiarities we need to take care of. We know that b.f.s and pl.f.s are such that
in other words, both b and pl b can be represented by vectors with N − 2 coordinates as we have previously seen. On the other side
so that Q b needs N coordinates to be represented (even though the dimension of Q is still N − 2). A comm.f. corresponds then to a vector of
Commonality assignment. We can as before express Q b as a sum function by computing its Moebius inverse. We can use Lemma 1 to change the coordinate base and get the coordinates of Q b with respect to the base {b A , ∅ ⊆ A ⊆ Θ}:
which we can call basic commonality assignment (b.comm.a.). q b has an interesting interpretation in terms of belief values.
so that the b.comm.a. q b (B) can be expressed as
Properties of basic commonality assignments. Basic commonality assignments are not normalized, as
In other words, whereas belief functions are normalized sum functions (n.s.f.) with non-negative Moebius inverse, and plausibility functions are normalized sum functions, commonality functions are unnormalized sum functions. Going back to the above example, the b.comm.a. associated with m b (x) = 1/3, m b (Θ) = 2/3 is (by Equation (9))
Commonality space. Analogously to the case of belief and plausibility functions, we can use here the notion of basic commonality assignment (Theorem 1) to recover the shape of the space Q ⊂ R N of all commonality functions, or "commonality space".
Theorem 2. The commonality space Q is a simplex
Proof
with Q A given by Equation (10). If we neglect the coordinate Q b (∅) which is constant ∀b, the commonality space Q 2 can then be drawn as in Figure 3 . The vertices of Q 2 are, according to Equation (10) and using all N coordinates,
Congruence of Equivalent Models
The equivalence of the three models based on basic probability, plausibility, and commonality assignments as descriptions of uncertainty geometrically translates as congruence of the associated simplices. We saw that for binary frames, B and PL are congruent, i.e. they can be superposed by means of a rigid transformation. This is indeed a general property. Cl(b A , b B ) and Cl(pl A , pl B ) of belief and plausibility spaces are congruent, namely
Lemma 2. The corresponding 1-dimensional sides
Proof. This a direct consequence of the definition of plausibility function. Let us denote with C, D two generic subsets of Θ.
However, as belief and plausibilities are dual representations of the same evidence, a dual probability can be defined as the relative belief of singletons
We can prove thatb meets a set of dual properties with respect to ⊕, which are the dual of those ofpl b [9, 16] . These dual properties involve the Dempster's sum of plausibility functions (instead of belief functions). This should not surprise at this point. We have proven in Section 3.1 that plausibility functions are themselves sum functions, which admit a Moebius inverse: the basic plausibility assignment. But then nothing prevents from applying Equation (11) to the b.pl.a.s of a pair of plausibility functions, instead of belief functions. We can then easily prove that Intersection probability. From a different point of view, each belief function determines an "interval probability", i.e. a set of probability measures p : Θ → [0, 1] on the same domain Θ which meet a lower bound associated with the belief values on all outcomes x ∈ Θ, and an upper bound determined by the corresponding plausibility values:
Now, there are clearly many ways of selecting one of those measures as representative of the above interval probability. However, as each interval [b(x), pl b (x)] has the same weight in the interval probability, there is no reason for the different singletons x to be treated differently. This function has been called intersection probability [17] , as it is geometrically located on the segment joining a pair of belief-plausibility functions. The situation is clearly visible in the binary case of Figure 2 , where the line a(b, pl b ) joining such a pair is drawn: p[b] lies at the intersection of this line with the region P of all probability functions. Again, as linear combination of a b.f. and a pl.f., its analysis requires the Moebius inversion of pl b [17] .
Conclusions
In this paper we introduced two alternative formulations of the theory of evidence by proving that both pl.f.s and comm.f.s share with belief functions the combinatorial structure of sum function, and computing their Moebius inverses which we called basic plausibility and commonality assignments. From a combinatorial point of view, b.f.s, pl.f.s and comm.f.s form a hierarchy of sum functions whose Moebius inverse meets both normalization and positivity axiom (b.p.a.), only the normalization constraint (b.pl.a.), and none of them (b.comm.a.) respectively. The related spaces possess a similar convex geometry. Their congruence is the geometric reflection of the equivalence of those alternative formulations, which can be successfully applied to problems like the probabilistic approximation of a belief function.
